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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
LICENSING: THE GREAT DELUSION
HAROLD

P. GREEN*

Operation of nuclear power plants involves inherent risk to the health
and safety of the public. The AEC licensing process ostensibly seeks
to determine whether plant design, construction, and operation adequately protect the public from the potential perils of nuclear power.
Whereas many other highly beneficial technologies involving substantial risk also are licensed and regulated to enable society to enjoy their
benefits Without being subject to excessive hazards, the process of licensing nuclear power plants is unique in one major respect: the
Atomic Energy Act contemplates that safety determinations will be
made on the basis of public hearings in which concerned members of
the public may participate as parties. This Article will explore the usefulness of this technique in resolving safety issues and will demonstrate
that the process, at least as heretofore implemented, is at best a charade
and at worst a sham.
I. THE RIsKs INHERENT IN NUCLEAR POWER
There are two categories of risk inherent in the operation of nuclear
power plants. First is the possibility that incident to a plant's normal
operations the public will be exposed to excessive levels of radiation.

Of equal or greater concern is the risk that an accident will result in a
nuclear explosion. Part 20 of the AEC's regulations' requires that nuclear power plants be operated in such manner that no member of the

public is exposed to radiation in excess of certain specified limits, that
concentrations of radioactive effluents be kept within certain specified
limits, and that radioactive discharges be maintained as far below these
limits as practicable. 2 These regulations, evidencing the determination
by the AEC that power plant operation in compliance therewith adequately protects public health and safety, reflect a balancing of the
- A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. Professor of Law and Director of the Law,
Science and Technology Program, The George Washington University National Law
Center.
1. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-.601 (1973).
2. Id. § 20.1 (c).
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benefits to be gained from the use of nuclear power against the risks
inherent in normal plant operation.3
It is only since the beginning of the atomic era in 1945 that man-

made radiation has been discharged into the environment in significant
quantity. Although there is no scientifically accepted evidence that
somatic injury has resulted from exposure to radiation within the levels
contemplated by existing radiation protection guides such as Part 20,4
it has been established that exposure to large amounts of radiation at
one time, or cumulatively over a period of time, can result in such
injury.5 Moreover, scientists have been unwilling to accept the premise
that there is a threshold of radiation exposure below which no injury

will result.6 Such a determination can be made only through sophisticated epidemiological studies over a very long term.7 At this time,
therefore, it cannot be said that cumulative exposure to even extremely

low levels of radiation over a long period involves no somatic risk.8
Radiation exposure also involves genetic risks. It is generally accepted
by scientists that any exposure of the gonads to radiation tends cumulatively to produce undesirable- genetic mutations.9 Accordingly, all

such exposures resulting from the operation of nuclear power plants
3. For example, the requirement that radiation exposures and discharges of radioactive effluents be as far below Part 20 limits as practicable entails maintenance of such
discharges "as low as is practicably achievable taking into account the state of technology,
and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety
and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." Id. (emphasis
supplied).
4. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY Cozmr.AmrE ON =n BIOLoGICAL EFFEcrs OF IONIZING RADIATION ON "THE EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF EXPOSURE To Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION" 205 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as BEIR REPORT).
5. NAT7OxAL COuNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECnON AND MEAsuREmENTs, BASIc RADIATION
PROTCTON ChrrrAs 6-9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NCRP REPORT]. The NCRP is
generally regarded as the most authoritative source of radiation protection standards
in the United States. Part 20 of the AEC regulations is based upon, and essentially
equivalent to, standards recommended by the NCRP.
6. Id. at 57. On the other hand, it is said that rejection of a threshold is based
upon "conservative planning." Id.

7. BEIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 205-10.
8. The no-threshold concept "involves the thesis that there is no exposure limit

free from some degree of risk.' NCRP REPORT, supra note 5, at 59. Whatever risks
exist may be substantially greater for some persons than for others. For example, risks
are greater for pregnant women, women exposed shortly before conception, the fetus,
and young children.
9. BEIR REPORT, supra note 4, at 90-128; NCRP REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-9.
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must be presumed to have at least a tendency towards producing genetic
injury in the population. 10
The basic premise underlying radiation protection standards is that
any exposure to man-made radiation is undesirable and may be harmful
and that, therefore, exposure should be tolerated only as long as the
benefits outweigh the risks." Part 20 of the AEC regulations reflects
that agency's judgment that the benefits of nuclear power justify the
levels of exposure permitted. It may be, of course, that further scientific research or experience demonstrating that the hazards are greater
than presently believed will necessitate a tightening of Part 20 standards. Until such evidence is forthcoming, however, there exists the
possibility that the public is, and for a considerable period of time has
2
been, exposed to injurious levels of radiation under present standards.'
The second category of risk involves the potential for a catastrophic
accident. As the nuclear power plant operates, an inventory of waste
fission products is built up in the fuel elements, these elements being removed periodically for chemical reprocessing and replacement. The
fission products are extremely toxic, by unit of weight one million to
one billion times more toxic than any other substance known to man. 13
An accident causing release of these waste products into the environment could result in enormous damage to life and property many orders
10. It should be noted that the somatic and genetic effects of radiation from nuclear
power plants are cumulative and must be considered in the light of exposure to radiation
from other sources, such as background natural radiation and medical and dental
x-rays.
11. Report of the Federal Radiation Council, May 13, 1960, 1 CCH AToM. EN. L.
REP. IT4046, at 9115. A similar recommendation was included in the BEIR REPoRT,
supra note 4, at 7. The NCRP REPoRT, supra note 5, at 24, states: "From the probably
extreme viewpoint of the conservationist-biologist, the most desirable objective would
be to eliminate all radiation exposure except natural radiation. This attitude is incompatible with the utilization of radiation for beneficial purposes"
12. It should be noted that radiation exposure resulting from nuclear power activities
constitutes only a small fraction of the population's total exposure to radiation. It has
been estimated that the total average annual whole-body dose exposure of the population in the United States in 1970 was 182 millirem, of which 102 millirem was attributable to natural radiation, 73 millirem to medical exposures, and only 0.003 millirem
to radiation from nuclear power activities. It has been estimated that by the year 2000
the average dose from nuclear power sources will be 0.17 millirem. BEIR REPORT,
supra note 4, at 23-39. Of course, some individuals and groups are exposed to radiation
levels substantially in excess of these averages.
13. Hearings before the Joint Conmittee on Atomic Energy on Government Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1956) (testimony of C. Rogers McCullough).
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of magnitude greater than that conceivably resulting from any other
existing technology.
The probability of such an accident is extremely low. Great care is
taken in designing, constructing, and operating nuclear power plants
not only to protect against occurrence of a serious malfunction but also
to ensure that fission products could be contained without reaching the
environment should there be a malfunction. The stringency of AEC
regulation and the multiple levels of independent review in the licensing
process provide further assurance against such an occurrence. Nevertheless, the possibility of catastrophic accident is explicitly recognized.
Licensees are required to establish plans for the evacuation of the
population in the event of a serious accident, 14 and the Price-Anderson
Act amendments", to the Atomic Energy Act establish an unprecedented half-billion dollar government indemnity with a statutory limit
on aggregate liability of $560 million in the event of such an accident.
There is little question that, given present scientific and technological
knowledge and capability, licensed nuclear power plants are as safe as
possible, consistent with their operation in an economically viable manner. On the other hand, obvious and significant risks remain. The 40
years for which plants are licensed to operate is more than twice the
period any plant in the United States has been in operation to date.
Many safety features are regarded as adequate on the basis of theoretical
analysis only, unsupported by experimental verification or the lessons
of experience. Safe operation is dependent upon a system's behavior in
the manner predicted by experts and the absence of unforeseeable events
or acts of God more severe than can reasonably be foreseen.
Safety is, of course, also dependent on the human factor. AEC regulations explicitly recognize, for example, that individuals operating reactor controls must have no physical or mental condition impairing
their motor functions or sound judgment, and medical examinations
are required.'6 Obviously, however, the fact that an operator receives
a clean bill of physical and mental health one day does not eliminate
the possibility that a serious, unobserved medical or psychiatric problem may develop the next.
II. THE OPPosIToN To NUCLEAR POWER
That such risks exist does not mean that nuclear power plants should
not be constructed and operated. Danger to health and safety is in14. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50, Appendix E (1973).
15: 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970).
16. 10 C.F.R. § 55.11 (1973).
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herent in almost every aspect of our complex society. There is, however, a legitimate question whether the risks associated with nuclear
power, particularly that of an immensely catastrophic accident, should
be thrust upon the public merely by virtue of a utility's decision to
operate a nuclear power plant and the AEC's licensing decision that the
risks are acceptable. It certainly is debatable, for example, whether
meeting energy demands warrants subjecting a possibly unwilling public to these risks or whether alternative forms of power generation, such
as coal, oil, or gas, may not be preferable notvithstanding higher costs
and other forms of environmental pollution resulting from their use.
Issues of this kind are appropriately resolved at the political level.
Although the Atomic Energy Act itself could be regarded as entailing
such a political determination, neither passage of the Act in 1954, nor
subsequent amendments thereto, nor the appropriation of funds to the
AEC has involved any real public or political discussion or debate over
the acceptability of the risks or the balance to be struck between the
benefits and risks of nuclear power. 17 This situation is largely attributable to the role of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy and its symbiotic relationship with the AEC. These two bodies,
convinced that nuclear power is necessary, desirable, and adequately
safe, have cooperated over the years in efforts to avoid disclosure of the
risks, for fear of unduly alarming the public, and to smother opposition
to nuclear power. These efforts have been successful because of the
unique nature of the JCAE, its domination of the atomic energy program, and its evolution as a power center functionally independent of
the Congress as a whole. The power of the JCAE in controlling the
consideration of atomic energy matters in the Congress has made it impossible for opponents of nuclear power to press their contentions
effectively at the political level.'"
As a consequence of their inability to contest nuclear power in the
legislative arena, critics of nuclear power have concentrated their efforts
in opposition to licensing of individual plants. The vehicles for such
opposition are local groups of citizens and national organizations dedicated to environmental values, frequently aided by a loose nationwide
network of nuclear power opponents. In the experience of the author,
17. Nowhere in the legislative history is there explicit, or even implicit, resolution
of these issues.
18. For a description of the Joint Committee and its relationships with the AEC,
see H. GREEN & A. RosENTHAL, GOVERNMENT OF TE AToM: THE INTEGRATION OF
PowExs (1963).
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these groups are composed of intelligent, well-meaning individuals who
have attempted to educate themselves on nuclear power and who are
seriously concerned about the risks. They are not, as has at times been
suggested, puppets for economic interests opposed to nuclear power.
Their efforts, stemming from a generalized fear of nuclear power, in
some instances are aimed at blocking construction of a plant completely, while in other cases their objective is to ensure that a plant will
be "as safe as possible." ' 9
Characterization of the opposition to nuclear power as "irresponsible" 20 is excessively harsh. Although some positions and statements
of opponent groups are so grossly inaccurate or exaggerated as to suggest irresponsibility, it is necessary to identify the cause of this situation.
Critics of nuclear power are severely limited in resources with which to
frame their objections. Because of the suppression of candid discussion
of the risks of nuclear power by the atomic energy establishment, there
is no body of authoritative information readily accessible to the concerned public describing the nature and dimensions of such risks. Nor
do such groups generally have access to scientific talent to assist them
in framing their concerns in a factual and scientific manner. While this
is especially true for local citizen groups, even the experts who are
available to national organizations tend to be individuals understandably 2' outside the mainstream of knowledge and experience with respect to the risks of nuclear power. The input of whatever experts
may be available, in person or through their writings, tends to be translated into political rhetoric, their pronouncements being relied upon
by the anti-nuclear network for want of any better information.
19. It may be observed that nothing, including nuclear power plants, can ever be
"as safe as possible." Everything can always be made safer at greater cost. A nuclear
power plant can be as safe as possible only if it does not operate at all. If it is to
operate, it can always be made to operate more safely if greater costs are incurred.
Inevitably, however, a point is reached at which the costs of enhancing safety are
disproportionately and unrealistically large in comparison to the incremental safety
to be achieved. The decision to license operation of a plant is based, therefore, on a
determination that the plant's operation will be adequately safe and that making it
"safer" would be unnecessarily costly. See Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear
Power Licensing: A Critical View, 43 NoTRu DAMp LAW. 633, 655 n.125 (1968).
20. A recent example is the address of AEC Commissioner William 0. Doub, Meeting the Challenge to Nuclear Energy Head-On, before the annual conference of the
Atomic Industrial Forum, November 12, 1973 (AEC Press Release No. S-13-73).
21. The real experts on nuclear power safety are employed at one level or another
in the nuclear power program. It is hardly to be expected that they will be available,
at least openly, to challenge the proposition that nuclear power is adequately safe.
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These difficulties are exacerbated by the role of the AEC staff. Ideally,
the public should look to a regulatory agency as the unequivocal defender of the public interest. In the context of nuclear power licensing,
the ideal requires that the AEC appear to subject license applications to
the most searching and skeptical inquiry, exposing all risks to the utmost scrutiny. Unfortunately, the AEC's licensing procedures do not
produce this image. Although the license application is in fact subjected
to exceptionally careful and stringent review, this process takes place
on a relatively informal basis beyond public view. Once the regulatory
staff is satisfied that the application is in order, that all questions have
been resolved satisfactorily, and that the license should be issued, it
becomes an active and vigorous proponent of issuance. Moreover, it is
this role of the staff in justifying its conclusion which has high public
visibility. Rather than hearing the staff candidly discuss the risks, the
public hears only comments designed to allay public concern and reflecting the view that the risks are acceptable.22
Thus, the regulatory staff tells the public,2" for example, that radiation discharges from a plant in normal operation will be only a small
fraction of natural background radiation; that such discharges are well
within Part 20 limits; and that a person living on a plant's perimeter for
a year will receive less exposure to radiation than he would receive in
a single round-trip jet flight from New York to Los Angeles. Nothing
is said, of course, concerning the possible adverse somatic or genetic
consequences of exposure to any incremental man-made radiation.
Similarly, the public is told all the reasons why a serious accident is
highly improbable. Postulated accidents are discussed on the unstated
premise that safety systems will work as predicted to limit the consequences of a malfunction. No reference is made to the various uncertainties arising from the absence of experimental data, the limited
operating experience with nuclear power plants, and the possibility of
human error or unforeseeable events. There is no discussion of the
consequences if the system does not work as advertised, nor is there
mention of the significance of the Price-Anderson Act.2 In short, the
position and statements of the regulatory staff are calculated to en22. Indeed, in licensing cases critics of nuclear power usually regard the AEC staff,
rather than the applicant, as the principal adversary.
23. The staff's position is set forth in a document known as the safety evaluation
report and in the environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. S§ 4321-4347 (1970).
24. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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courage the public belief that only some kind of "nut" would be concerned about a plant's safety.
The staff's role encourages those members of the public who have
some prior basis for concern to believe that the AEC is willfully concealing the real facts. Such a belief leads, naturally, to attacks on the
integrity of the AEC and its licensing process. It also results in the
determination on the part of these concerned individuals to intervene
in the licensing process to attempt to force the real facts into the open.
III.

HEARING PROCEDURES IN NUCLEAR LICENSING

The recent focal point of opposition to nuclear power plants has
been the public hearings involved in the licensing process.'- Of primary
importance to those seeking to block issuance of construction permits
and operating licenses for individual plants is section 189(a) of the
Atomic Energy Act, which provides that in any licensing proceeding
"the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit
any such person as a party to such proceeding." 26 The Commission
has followed a liberal policy of granting intervention by members of
the public who allege in their petitions for intervention that their lives,
health, or property may be adversely affected by normal operation of
the plant or by a potential accident. An examination of the historical
development of section 189 (a) is essential to appreciation of the present
nature of the licensing process.
Legislative history of the original section 189(a), enacted as part of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is sparse. It is indeed remarkable
7
that, although the 1954 Act produced a voluminous legislative history
and itself reflects an obsessive concern with health and safety,28 the risks
of nuclear power and its health and safety implications 'were scarcely
discussed in the hearings, committee report, or floor debates. A careful
reading of the legislative history provides little reason to believe that
Congress ever contemplated that section 189(a) would be used by
25. A description of the AEC licensing process may be found in Hennessey, Licensing
of Nuclear Powrer Plants by the Atomic Energy Commission, 15 Wm.& MARY L. REv.
487, 489-91 (1974).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
27. Most of the discussion centered upon the controversy as to public, as opposed
to private, power generation.
28. There are no less than 25 references to "health and safety of the public" (or
similar phrases) in the Act.
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intervenors seeking to contest issuance of licenses on health and safety
grounds. A more reasonable inference is that the section was regarded
as a vehicle for the contesting of licenses on economic grounds.
Nevertheless, only two years after the Act became law, section
189(a) was used as a basis for health and safety intervention in a nuclear power licensing case. Three international labor unions employed
the section to intervene in an effort to set aside issuance of a construction permit to the Power Reactor Development Company.29 The permit was issued notwithstanding a secret (but leaked) report by the
30
Commission's prestigious Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
indicating that there were serious unresolved safety questions. Significantly, issuance of the permit was politically controversial since it was
opposed by the Democratic-controlled JCAE.
As a result of these developments, Congress in 1957 amended section
189 (a) to mandate a hearing on every nuclear power plant construction
permit and operating license application. 3' The report of the JCAE on
the bill observed: "[F]ull, free, and frank discussion in public of the
hazards involved in any particular reactor would seem to be the most
certain way of assuring that the reactor will indeed be safe and that
the public will be fully apprised of this fact." 32 In 1962, section 189(a)
was again amended. The requirement for mandatory hearings was
eliminated with respect to operating licenses but retained for construction permits. 33 Thus, under the present version of the Act, a hearing is
held on each construction permit application, whether or not anyone
intervenes in opposition. If there is an intervention, the intervenors become parties in the mandatory hearing. Hearings at the operating license
stage, however, are held only if there is an intervention.
In most mandatory hearings until the late 1960's, there were no interventions and therefore no opposition to issuance of the license. Only
the applicant and the AEC regulatory staff, both supporting issuance of
the license, were parties to the proceeding. Any elements of contro29. See CCH ATom. EN. L. REP. 11,201 (1972).
30. The ACRS is a prestigious body of experts in various disciplines relating to
reactor safety. It was the policy of the AEC to have the ACRS consider each nuclear
power license application. In 1957, the Act was amended to make the ACRS a statutory
body (see 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1970)) and to require that it consider each license application and submit to the AEC a report, which becomes part of the public record, on
the application (see id. § 2232). See generally Green, supra note 19, at 639.
31. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 7, 71 Stat. 579.
32. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1957).
33. Act of Aug. 29, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-615, § 2, 76 Stat. 409.
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versy were, for the most part, attributable to questions raised sua sponte
by the presiding officer at the hearing. Under these circumstances, the
Commission came to view the hearings as an educational process through
which it could be demonstrated to the public that nuclear power plants
were indeed safe and that the Commission's review processes were
meticulously thorough and careful. 34 Moreover, although the uncontested mandatory hearings were extremely burdensome to the AEC
and the applicant, both made a virtue of their necessity and pointed to
the public hearings as providing further evidence that nuclear power
plants were safe.3 5
Beginning about 1968, however, interventions in opposition to issuance of construction permits and operating licenses became more the
rule than the exception. In addition, as concern about environmental
values became more faddish, public interest lawyers, many of whom
were skilled trial attorneys, joined the fray as counsel to intervenors.
Hearings have tended to become long and acrimonious with much
procedural wrangling,8" the entire process has become extremely costly
in terms of dollars, and there have been some delays in commencement
of nuclear power plant construction and operation. Despite these obstacles, however, the nuclear power licensing program moves inexorably
forward. Although in a few cases intervenors have won minor conces34. In 1965, the AEC constituted a seven-member Regulatory Review Panel of outside experts. This panel characterized the significant functions of public hearings in
uncontested cases as follows: to give the public a "firsthand impression of the applicant's character and competence"; to show the public that "the AEC has been diligent
in protecting the public's interest" and that the regulatory staff and the ACRS "have
only the public's interest in mind"; to give the public a "convincing demonstration"
that there has been a "thorough and competent review" of the application; to develop
a factual record in public; and to provide the public with a "forum for recording its
views, both pro and con." REPORT TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION BY THE REGULATORY REvav PANEL 5-9 (July 14, 1965) [hereinafter cited as REvIEw PANEL].
35. See, e.g., ATOMIC INiUsmtaL FORUM, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ATOMIC PowER
SAFETY 30 (1968).

36. An extreme case was the application of Long Island Lighting Company to construct the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The application was filed May 15, 1968,
and notice of hearing was published February 25, 1970. As a result of procedural
skirmishing and questions relating to implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act, hearings did not commence until September 21, 1970. Hearings on radiological health and safety issues consumed 56 days. After over 5,000,000 words of testimony in 15,000 pages of transcript, the decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board was released April 12, 1973. Although strenuous opposition by intervenors was
a major cause of the protracted proceedings, it should be noted that the necessity for
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act contributed to the delay.
In re Long Island Lighting Co, No. 50-322 (AEC, Apr. 12, 1973).
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sions, it is difficult to identify any case in which it is clear that intervenors have been "successful," since in each case a construction permit
or license, substantially as requested, has been granted at the end of
the proceeding.
IV.

THE USEFULNESS OF THE HEARING PROCEDURES

A nuclear power licensing case is not set for hearing until the AEC
regulatory staff has determined that a construction permit or operating
license, as the case may be, should be issued. Upon filing, an application
is reviewed thoroughly by the staff. Through personal exchanges and
correspondence, questions are raised by the staff and answered by the
applicant, and the application may be amended to meet the staff's concerns. Simultaneous with this process, the application is reviewed by
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. Much of the result
of these procedures is available to public scrutiny in the AEC's public
document room; nevertheless, a case does not really "go public" by
the setting of a hearing on a construction permit or provision of notice
of proposed issuance of an operating license (triggering an opportunity
to petition for intervention) until both the staff and the ACRS are
satisfied that the permit or license should be issued. Although some
differences of opinion between the applicant and the regulatory staff
may surface publicly in this process, differences of opinion among the
staff's experts, resolved through hierarchical processes leading to unitary
staff conclusions, remain hidden from public view. Similarly, the public record does not reveal differences of opinion among members of
the ACRS, whose reports reflect an obvious attempt to reach consensus,37 or between the ACRS and the regulatory staff.3 8 As a result,

much of the initial licensing process operates to conceal from the public
the weak or questionable safety aspects of a plant. Moreover, for an
intervenor to prevail, he must successfully challenge the ultimate conclusions reached by the applicant and its team, including the applicant's
reactor supplier, architect-engineer, and array of outside consultants;
the AEC staff, including its array of outside consultants; and the ACRS.
37. In only a very few cases have ACRS members submitted dissenting or separate
statements.
38. The Regulatory Review Panel (see note 34 supra) recommended that every effort
be made to conceal differences of opinion between the ACRS and regulatory staff
from public view.,. It proposed that joint meetings be held to reconcile differences and
that divergent reports be made public only if agreement cannot be reached. REviEv
PANEL, supra note 34, at 13.
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This obviously is no small undertaking. The applicant and the staff
can produce scores of outstandingly qualified and experienced expert
witnesses to testify in support of issuance. Intervenors, on the other
hand, are typically faced with a lack of funds with which to produce
expert witnesses. Furthermore, even if limited funds are available, it is
highly unlikely that experts capable of matching the competence and
experience of the aggregate of talent on the other side can be gathered.
In most cases, therefore, the intervenors are forced to attempt to make
their case, or substantial portions of it, on cross-examination. This is,
however, difficult to do effectively without competent technical assistance.
A factor somewhat alleviating these difficulties is that hearings are
before a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, two members of which are scientists or engineers with considerable knowledge
and experience in the nuclear power field., 9 Although the performance
of the Board is far from uniform, 40 questions inadequately raised by
intervenors occasionally are pursued by members of the Board. Nevertheless, it is difficult to discern, given the limited resources and technical
competence available to intervenors, how appropriate resolution of
health and safety questions is served by intervenor participation in the
licensing process. The most that can be said is that the right to intervene provides concerned members of the public an opportunity to vent
their frustrations and concerns and to force a public response (although
usually in language not readily comprehensible to the public) by the
applicant and the staff to the questions raised.
The problems facing intervenors are exacerbated by the relation between the manner in which hearings are structured and the generalized
concern about the safety of a nuclear power plant which, in most cases,
is at the heart of opposition to nuclear power. Rather than being
troubled by specific aspects of the mechanics of plant operation, inter39. In 1962, the Commission was authorized to establish Atomic Safety and Licensing
Boards, "each composed of three members, two of whom shall be technically qualified
and one of whom shall be qualified in the conduct of administrative proceedings," to
conduct hearings and make intermediate or final decisions as specified by the Commission. Act of Aug. 29, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-615, § 1, 76 Stat. 409. This provision
subsequently was amended to state that the two members formerly required to be
technically qualified "shall have such technical or other qualifications as the Commission deems appropriate to the issues to be decided." 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970) (emphasis
supplied). In practice, two members of an ASLB are always "technically qualified" in
licensing proceedings in which health and safety issues predominate.
40. In each proceeding, the three-member ASLB is drawn from a panel of full-time
and part-time participants.
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venors seek to press their contention that radioactivity may emanate
from a plant, as a total system, in normal operation and as a result of
accidents. The AEC's procedures, however, do not permit intervenors
to pursue these generalized concerns. The essence of the Commission's
position is that its regulations establish adequate safety standards and
that a finding that a nuclear facility has been constructed and will
operate in conformity with the regulations requires issuance of a license. 4 Moreover, under the Commission's rules of practice, the adequacy of its regulations in protecting the health and safety of the public
may not be challenged in a licensing proceeding.42 The only course
open to intervenors, therefore, is to attempt to establish that radioactive effluents in normal plant operation will be in excess of Part 20
limits or to discredit the staff's optimistic analyses of postulated accidents and their consequences by demonstrating that a specific type of
accident with specific consequences can occur. Any effort to establish
that operation of a plant in conformity with the regulations may nevertheless unreasonably endanger health and safety is barred. As a result,
hearings become forums for considering matters with respect to which
intervenors have the least interest and competence. Correspondingly, the
results of a hearing are substantially preordained.
41. The authbr recently represented intervenors in a nuclear power licensing case
in which the Commission's position was challenged as, in effect, reducing to a superfluous nullity requirements that issuance of a license not be inimical to the health and
safety of the public (42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d) (1970); 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a) (6)
(1973)) and that there be reasonable assurance that activities under the license can be
conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public (10 C.F.R. § 50.57
(a) (3) (1973)). Although the latter determination is not explicitly required by the Act,
section 182(a) thereof requires that a license application contain such information as
will enable the AEC to find that the utilization of special nuclear material, that is,
nuclear fuel, "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."
42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1970). The "reasonable assurance" determination required by the
Commission's regulations has been interpreted to be the equivalent of this statutory
requirement. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec, Radio, & Mach.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 407 (1961). The contention of the intervenors in this recent
challenge was that the Commission's rules and regulations establish only minimum
standards to be met by each licensed facility and that the risks remaining after
full conformity with the rules and regulations must be assessed and dealt with in the
context of the "reasonable assurance" and "not inimical" determinations. The intervenors' position was rejected by the Commission. In re Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Co., No. 50-309, ALAB-161 (AEC, Nov. 30, 1973). A petition for review of the Commission's decision has been filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
42. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758 (1973).
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Provisions of the Atomic Energy Act making public hearings an integral part of the licensing process and permitting easy access to participation through intervention in effect entice opponents of nuclear
power to expend substantial time and money in what amounts to a
futile exercise. Although it may be argued that providing opponents
with the opportunity to intervene and participate, as they see fit, is
enlightened public policy, the structuring of hearings to preclude those
who choose to intervene from pursuing the specific issues of paramount
concern to them substantially diminishes the benefits of such a policy.
Nevertheless, restrictions in the hearing procedures may be justifiable
on the ground that hearings otherwise would be unduly protracted,
diffuse, and burdensome.
It is time that the present system be reconsidered from the standpoint
of what it really contributes to sound decisions on the licensing of
nuclear power plants. A utility considering construction of a nuclear
power plant faces the certainty of a hearing at the construction permit
stage and the likelihood of a second hearing at the operating license
stage. These hearings may be protracted and lead to delays in construction or operation. If delay occurs at the operating license stage,
substantial costs to the utility may result, since the plant stands idle
while interest, wages, and salaries must nevertheless be paid. It makes
no sense to saddle persons, even utilities, with such burdens unless some
useful purpose is served.
It is highly doubtful that the Commission's hearing procedures contribute in any appreciable way to the safety of nuclear power plants. It
may be argued that the hearings enhance safety in a psychological
sense in that the applicant and the regulatory staff, aware that their
judgments may be subject to public scrutiny in an adversary hearing,
will be more cautious, careful, and thorough than otherwise would be
the case. On the other hand, the hearing procedures tend to diffuse
responsibility and accountability for safety determinations. As has been
noted,4 3 the decision that a plant is adequately safe actually is made by
the regulatory staff before the case reaches the hearing arena. If a
licensed plant turns out to have demonstrably adverse consequences to
the health and safety of the public, it can be readily conceived that the
regulatory staff will contend that it did the best it could, that its efforts
were subject to review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and
that there was full opportunity for members of the public to participate
43. See text preceding note 22 smpra.
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and to call deficiencies to the attention of the Board. The process thus
can result in shifting responsibility for mistakes from the staff, where
the mistakes were really made, to the ASLB or to the public generally.
Moreover, the hearing procedures are counterproductive from the
standpoint of gaining public acceptance of nuclear power plants. Those
concerned about the safety of a plant are not persuaded by the conclusions reached in the hearing process. On the contrary, they typically are
frustrated and infuriated by the role of the regulatory staff at the hearings. Indeed, it usually is the staff, rather than the applicant, which
emerges as the major proponent of issuance of a license and the principal villain of the opponents. In addition, the ASLB generally is
viewed as a biased puppet of the nuclear establishment that merely
goes through the motions of respectfully tolerating the interloping
intervenors.
V.

IMPROVING THE LICENSING PROCESS

Public hearing procedures and the availability of intervention in nuclear power licensing appear to be primarily cosmetic devices, providing the illusion but not the reality of public participation in the
process. The illusion, moreover, is maintained at substantial and unnecessary economic cost to the applicant, the government, and intervenors, resulting in at most minimal contributions to the safety aspects
of nuclear power, public confidence in the licensing process, and the
credibility of the AEC.44 The very fact that a substantial number of
license applications are contested by intervenors purporting to represent
the public interest indicates a public belief that the regulatory staff of
the AEC, and perhaps the Commission as well, is not representing the
public interest.
Nevertheless, the Commission's response to the problems has been
merely to tinker with its rules of practice. This tinkering has been based
on the assumption that public opposition to nuclear power will continue
to be manifested in interventions in licensing cases. Recognizing that its
policies have led to well-founded allegations that important information
44. Former AEC Commissioner James T. Ramey, who was Executive Director of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at the time the Act was amended to make hearings
mandatory (see notes 29-33 supra & accompanying text), has characterized the role of
intervenors as one of "nuclear blackmail," that is, a process whereby intervenors' counsel
"would threaten to drag out a case interminably unless various debatable concessions
were made by the applicant." Ramey, Jim RanVey's Viewpoint, Part III: Today's
Regulatory ffoes Date Back to the Fermi-I Case, NUCLEONIcS WVEEK, Dec. 20, 1973,
at 9-10.
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was withheld from intervenors, the AEC has adopted new procedures
to make more information available as a matter of course and to facilitate

and broaden discovery procedures. 45 The restructured rules, however, tighten the requirements

for intervention, 46 require inter-

venors to specify their contentions in detail, and limit the scope of
47
the intervenors' discovery and case to those contentions so specified.

In addition, the Commission is presently attempting to resolve through
rulemaking proceedings a number of major generic questions which
arise in the course of licensing cases, 48 with the expectation that the

promulgation of regulations dealing with these questions will remove
them from the scope of the licensing proceedings.

These actions have had little effect in changing the widespread belief
in the nuclear power establishment, government, and industry that the

present licensing process requires fundamental revision. Unfortunately,
however, the view persists that public hearings are an indispensable
part of the process, not because they contribute to proper resolution of
important issues but rather because it is politically infeasible to eliminate
them. As one authoritative establishment spokesman recently observed:
We made a decision 20 years ago to involve the public in these
decisions and, right or wrong, we are prisoners of that decision
today. It is highly unlikely that the environmental community
be willing to agree
and others interested in due process would
49
to the elimination of the hearings entirely.
45. See AEC Press Release No. P-231 (July 26, 1972). Under the previous rules,
notice of hearing on construction permits was published only shortly before the date
set for hearing and at a time when the staff and ACRS reviews were substantially completed; notice of proposed issuance of an operating license was published at about the
time the staff and ACRS reviews were completed. Thus, intervention was permitted
only very shortly before the hearing took place, with the result that the time available to intervenors to pursue discovery and to prepare for the hearing was severely
limited. In August 1972, the AEC adopted a new policy of permitting intervention as
s6on as practicable after an application has been accepted by the AEC, thus providing
intervenors substantially more time for discovery and preparation. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 2,
Appendix A, at i l (1973). For the rules with respect to discovery and access to official
information held by the AEC, see 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.740-2.744, 2.790 (1973).
46. Id. § 2.714.
47. Id.; id. § 2.740(b) (1).
48. The Commission has conducted rulemaking proceedings, for example, on the
adequacy of its Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems and
the numerical guides for determining when radioactive discharges from nuclear power
plants are "as low as practicable."
49. Ramey, supra note 44, at 10.
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Accordingly, it is argued, there should be hearings but they should be
structured to preclude opportunity for "nuclear blackmail," that is,
the causing of undue delay in the construction and operation of plants."0
A bill recently introduced in Congress by the leadership of the Joint
Committee attempts to implement this approach.' Under this proposal
an adversary-type hearing would be held on the suitability of a proposed site from the environmental standpoint. This hearing would
take place at a sufficiently early point in time so that, even if intervenors succeeded in forcing a very protracted hearing, it would not
interfere with construction schedules. At the construction permit stage,
there would be no opportunity for a hearing unless an intervenor makes
a prima facie showing of a significant, unresolved health or safety issue,
while at the operating license stage there would be a hearing only
upon a prima facie showing by an intervenor of unresolved safety
issues or changes in technology. At both the construction permit and
operating license stages, any hearings would be "legislative-type" rather
than "adversary-type." As a result, intervenors would have sharply
limited rights to discovery, subpoena, and cross-examination, their participation in effect being limited to making statements on questions of
concern to them. Provision for only legislative-type hearings seems to
be nothing more than a political cosmetic, a sop thrown to opponents
of nuclear power. Such hearings obviously can provide no more than
opportunity to "let off steam" and certainly could not alter the steamrolling course of events following upon approval of a license by the
regulatory staff and the ACRS. In actuality, they would only contribute to the frustrations and concerns of opponents of nuclear power.
In this era of participatory democracy in which so much emphasis
is placed on resort to litigation to remedy society's ills, it is tantamount
to heresy to advocate that the availability of public hearings as a forum
for public participation be curtailed rather than expanded. Nevertheless, the time has come for basic changes in the structure of the nuclear
power licensing process to eliminate unnecessary, costly, and delusive
features of public participation and to replace them with a more economic and efficient system that will in fact enhance the effectiveness
of public participation.
There are numerous other areas of technology, such as new drugs,
chemical food additives, and airworthiness of aircraft, in which par50. Id.
51. H.R. 11957, 93d Cong, 1st Sess. (1973).
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ticular products or activities are licensed on the basis of health and
safety determinations. The licensing process in such areas is usually
a bilateral affair between the person subject to licensing and the licensing agency. Administrative hearings may be part of the process, but
they generally arise, if at all, because the applicant is dissatisfied with
the agency's action and not at the instance of members of the public
who may be injured by a licensed product or activity. Although there
may be rare instances in which a public group is dissatisfied with the
agency's action and seeks a hearing, such procedures are extraordinary
and not a part of the established licensing process. The public is usually
willing to trust these agencies because their role is unequivocally that
of the watchdog defender of health or safety and not, as in the case
2
of the AEC, a benevolent big brother to industry.
Shortly after James R. Schlesinger became chairman of the AEC in
1971, he observed that while the Commission had previously "fostered
and protected the nuclear industry," henceforth it would not "fight
the industry's political, social, and commercial battles"; rather, it would
"perform as a referee serving the public interest." 53 Although Schlesinger's approach has been implemented in numerous concrete measures,
opponents of nuclear power still regard the AEC as industry's benevolent "big brother."
It is probably true that environmentalist groups would strenuously,
and perhaps successfully, oppose total elimination of hearings in the
nuclear power licensing process. If, however, it is recognized that the
real problem is a lack of public confidence in the AEC and its credibility, the obvious solution is for the Commission to do what is necessary to create credibility and confidence in itself so that opposition to
nuclear power would diminish and be directed to a political challenge
before Congress. A new policy of full candor is necessary, with au52. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission is responsible for promoting, as
well as regulating, the development of nuclear power. The existence of these "conflicting responsibilities" has been a major irritant to opponents of nuclear power. Pleas
have been made that the regulatory functions be completely separated from the promotional functions by p'acing them in a new regulatory agency. It is questionable
whether such a separation would contribute substantially to resolving the lack of public confidence, which appears to stem primarily from the reluctance of segments of
society to permit elite groups of experts to saddle society with enormous risks by
reason of the judgment of such experts that nuclear power is more beneficial than
dangerous. See Green, supra note 19.
53. Address by James R. Schlesinger, Expectations and Responsibilities of the Nuclear
Industry, All-Conference Banquet of the Atomic Industrial Forum-American Nuclear
Society Annual Meeting, Oct. 20, 1971 (AEC Press Release No. S-21-71).
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thoritative exposure of the benefits and risks of nuclear power plants
squarely and unequivocally before the public. More than any other
factor, it is the belief that something is being concealed or sugarcoated in the licensing process that triggers interventions. Given a
new policy of full and candid disclosure and discussion of benefits and
risks of nuclear power, opponents of nuclear power likely would be
quite willing to surrender the amorphous, dubious, and ineffective rights
they now have to contest nuclear power plant licenses.
Upon implementation of a policy of full disclosure, public hearings
concerning the mechanics of nuclear power plant operation should be
abandoned. The determination whether a plant has been designed and
constructed, and will be operated, to provide adequate protection to
the health and safety of the public should be made by the AEC's staff
of experts, and the staff should be held strictly accountable for its
decisions.
If there is to be a public hearing, it should take place solely at the
construction permit stage. The existing two-step licensing process with
its two separate proceedings, first for issuance of a construction permit
and then for issuance of an operating license, is anomalous and should
be abandoned. It simply is not credible that the AEC will refuse to
issue an operating license to a utility which has expended more than
S 100 million in construction of a nuclear power plant, the output of
which is required to meet energy needs. The plant should be permitted
to operate without legalistic fanfare and formal administrative proceedings once the AEC's experts are satisfied that it has been consructed in
accordance with the construction permit and that its operation will be
safe.
An adversary-type hearing early in the construction permit stage,
with a right provided interested members of the public to participate,
may be justifiable if limited to the issue of whether the particular proposed site is suitable, from the standpoint of health, safety, and environmental considerations, for the type of nuclear power plant that is
proposed. Insofar as health and safety aspects are concerned, the hearing should not involve consideration of the mechanics of plant operation
and construction but only the radiation to which the area surrounding
the plant may be subjected during normal operation and as a consequence of accidents. In this respect, intervenors should not be constrained by the assumption that operation in accordance with AEC
regulations means per se that the risks are acceptable.
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An essential element of such a hearing is a full and candid disclosure
by the applicant and the AEC of the potential consequences of operation of a plant. The public should be candidly informed, in ordinary
English free of scientific and technical jargon, of the maximum quantities of radiation that will be discharged into the environment in normal
operation and the potential consequences to health and life of exposure
to such radiation. There should be explicit statements concerning the
extent of present scientific knowledge regarding these effects, the areas
of present uncertainty, and the manner and time scale in which these
uncertainties may be resolved. With respect to the accident potential,
there should be a candid explanation of the potential consequences if
everytbhing goes wrong and all the fission products are released into the
environment, as well as a simple explanation of possible circumstances
or events that could produce such a result and the steps to be taken to
negate such a possibility. This latter explanation should include a candid
description of the state of the technology, that is, the extent to which
the technology upon which safety depends has been verified either
experimentally or through experience; any significant or unique elements of risk posed by the plant; and factors, such as human failure,
sabotage, acts of God, or miscalculation, which might defeat the safety
regime. Moreover, since the acceptability of risk turns intrinsically on
the importance of correlative benefits of a proposed nuclear plant, in
itself and in comparison with the benefits and risks of alternatives to
nuclear power, such benefits also should be candidly articulated.
Such a procedure would provide a clear opportunity for opponents
of nuclear power to raise and seek to have resolved the precise safety
issues which are of paramount concern to them. Since such a hearing
would not involve the specific technical details of plant operation, the
hearing could be held at a stage sufficiently early to permit the utility,
if necessary, to find another site or to change its plans in favor of an
alternative to a nuclear power plant. If the decision is to issue a construction permit, issuance might be conditioned upon the plant's meeting prescribed "environmental specifications." It would then be the
function of the AEC to ensure that the specific mechanics of plant
operation are appropriate and adequate and that the prescribed environmental specifications are met. The AEC should be relied upon
and trusted to ensure adequate safety in precisely the same manner as
is presently the case with the Federal Aviation Administration and the
Food and Drug Administration in their areas of responsibility.
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The cornerstone of this proposal, and indeed of any reform of the
licensing process, is a policy of full and candid disclosure of the benefits and risks of nuclear power, including risks incident to uncertainty,
in a form readily comprehensible to the public. Such disclosure might
be accomplished, for example, through requiring an applicant to include
in its application a separate statement of risks and benefits, the adequacy
of the statement being measured by standards patterned after those in
the Securities Act of 193 3 .4 Alternatively, or in addition, the AEC
regulatory staff might be required to issue such a statement.
In 1971, this author drafted possible amendments to the Atomic
Energy Act designed to implement a policy of full and candid disclosure. The text of this draft, which was intended only as a starting
point for discussion, provides as follows:
In order to facilitate public understanding and acceptance, each
applicant for a permit to construct and license to operate a
facility for industrial or commercial purposes shall submit as an
attachment to its application an assessment of the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the facility. In describing the anticipated benefits, the assessment shall take into consideration the
manner in which the facility, when operated, will contribute to
meeting needs for electric power and to improving the environment. In describing potential risks, the assessment shall take into
consideration the risks associated with operation of the facility,
the measures which the applicant has taken or intends to take to
eliminate or minimize such risks, and the degree of risk, if any,
to the health and safety of the public and to the environment
which remains, including risks which may result in the event of
unexpected malfunction of the applicant's equipment and procedures. The assessment shall be written in such a manner as will
make it comprehensible to the ordinary educated member of the
public.
The Commission shall, prior to issuing notice of hearing on, or
proposed issuance of a license to operate, any facility for industrial or commercial purposes, cause to be prepared by its staff and
included in the record of the proceeding an assessment of the anticipated benefits and potential risks of the facility. The assessment shall be written in such a manner as will make it comprehensible to the ordinary educated member of the public and shall
54. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 1 (1970).
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include a full and candid evaluation of the assessment prepared
by the applicant pursuant to Section 182(e).
It is difficult to discern, aside from any other considerations, how there
could be objection to a policy of full and candid articulation of the
risks and benefits of nuclear power. It might, however, be contended that it is simply not possible, given the tremendous technical
complexity of nuclear power technology, to reduce a discussion of risks
and benefits to simple language comprehensible to the ordinary educated person.5 5 Implicit in this objection is the notion that only experts
(in whom, incidentally, the opponents of nuclear power have little
confidence) are capable of defining and assessing risks and benefits and
reaching a valid conclusion whether the public will be willing to assume such risks in order to have the benefits that the experts think the
public ought to enjoy. The fact remains, however, that no authoritative source, including the industry, the AEC, and the JCAE, has ever
attempted to draft a full and candid statement of the risks and benefits
of nuclear power, a statement which it is believed, incidentally, could be
produced for any nuclear power plant in 10 double-spaced typewritten
pages. It is appropriate to throw an obstacle in the path of an obviously
desirable policy such as that of full and candid disclosure only when
impossibility has been demonstrated.
VI. CONCLUSION

The proposal herein outlined provides a simple and effective means
of lifting the nuclear power licensing program from the existing wasteful and counterproductive morass. It has, moreover, other salutary
aspects. Since there never has been an authoritative articulation in the
arena of public discussion of the actual risks of nuclear power plants,
public debate presently proceeds from two extreme positions. The
55. Consider, for example, the statement of Mr. Arvin E. Upton, a highly knowledgeable and experienced attorney who frequently has represented utilities in nuclear power
plant licensing cases: "I consider myself an average educated layman, and I have been
struggling with this process and the engineers and scientists involved in it for several
years, struggling trying to have testimony reduced to a form where it is comprehensible to me, because I feel if it's comprehensible to me, it can be comprehensible to
the average educated person. I despair frankly of really ever being able to put these
problems in terms which the average educated individual can understand." Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Comnittee on Atomic Energy oir
AEC Licensing Procedure and Related Legislation, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 354-55
(1971).

1974]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

525

atomic energy establishment urges that nuclear power is safe because
the establishment's experts are virtually unanimous in proclaiming that
the risks are minimal and acceptable. The opponents of nuclear power,
on the other hand, argue from a foundation of extreme exaggeration
and popular misconception. Their credibility, consequently, is easily
challenged. Each side attacks the other, usually ad hominemf while
the very nature of the controversy precludes the emergence of the
actual facts concerning the risks. A policy of full and candid disclosure
of risks and benefits would place all the cards, face-up, on the table.
Opponents of nuclear power would not have to resort to interventions
in licensing cases to try, usually futilely, to drag out the truth. In addition, the Commission's credibility would be enhanced. Perhaps most
importantly, a policy of full and candid disclosure in licensing cases
would provide, for the first time, an authoritative body of data on the
risks of nuclear power for use in the political arena, which is, after all,
where the nuclear power controversy belongs.

56. See Green, supra note 19, at 654 n.123.

